🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix null byte path truncation vulnerability#3582
🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix null byte path truncation vulnerability#3582EffortlessSteven wants to merge 1 commit into
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Added check to explicitly reject null bytes (`\0`) in `validate_model_request`
to prevent attackers from bypassing `.ends_with(".gguf")` extension checks
via path truncation when the path is passed to underlying C/OS APIs.
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Closing as superseded by #3626. Reason: duplicate null-byte model path validation fix. The canonical PR is ledger-aligned under |
Understood. Acknowledging that this work is now obsolete and stopping work on this task. |
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🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The
validate_model_requestfunction validated file extensions (e.g.,.gguf) using Rust's.ends_with(), but failed to reject null bytes (\0). This allowed path truncation attacks where a path likesecret.txt\0.ggufpasses the extension check but is truncated tosecret.txtwhen passed to underlying C/OS APIs.🎯 Impact: Attackers could bypass path validation to load arbitrary files or probe for file existence on the filesystem.
🔧 Fix: Explicitly check for and reject null bytes in the model path before performing extension or directory validation.
✅ Verification: Run
cargo test -p bitnet-server --lib security::tests::test_model_path_null_byte_rejection.PR created automatically by Jules for task 5554472715702630567 started by @EffortlessSteven