Add MASWE-0055: Sensitive Data Leaked via Screenshots #7
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cpholguera
changed the title
cpholguera
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Sep 26, 2025
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| - **Prevent screenshots using the `FLAG_SECURE` API**: On Android, use [`FLAG_SECURE`](https://developer.android.com/security/fraud-prevention/activities#flag_secure) to block screenshots and screen recordings of your app's content | ||
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| - **Detect taking a screenshot with `DETECT_SCREEN_CAPTURE` or `sceneCaptureState` API**: Use [`DETECT_SCREEN_CAPTURE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#DETECT_SCREEN_CAPTURE) on Android or [`sceneCaptureState`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uitraitcollection/scenecapturestate) on iOS to detect when a screenshot is taken, depending on the platform |
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Consider generalizing this, we have the best practices:
- https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/best-practices/MASTG-BEST-0014/ (and other related ones)
- iOS still TBD
Also, "detection" doesn't mitigate the weakness, I think. Only "prevention" does, right?
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To append on @cpholguera 's suggestions, one way to mitigate the issue is to not display sensitive data on screen at all (e.g. redact)
Diolor
suggested changes
Sep 28, 2025
| @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ | |||
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| title: Sensitive Data Leaked via Screenshots | |||
| title: Sensitive Data Leaked via Screenshots or Screen Recording | |||
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| title: Sensitive Data Leaked via Screenshots or Screen Recording | |
| title: Sensitive Data Leaked via Screenshots or Screen Recordings |
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| ## Overview | ||
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| Mobile platforms allow users and third-party tools to record screens, which can expose sensitive data and increase the risk of data leakage. |
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Let's follow the title :) Let's emphasize that this weakness is rather a covert channel for confidentiality breaches.
Suggested change
| Mobile platforms allow users and third-party tools to record screens, which can expose sensitive data and increase the risk of data leakage. | |
| Mobile platforms allow users and third-party tools to capture screenshots or record screens. Those could act as covert channels that can expose sensitive data and increase the risk of data leakage. |
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| - **Loss of Confidentiality**: Under certain conditions, an attacker could access sensitive data previously displayed on the screen, potentially compromising confidentiality and enabling further attacks, such as identity theft or account takeover. | ||
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| ## Modes of Introduction |
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This weakness needs a combination of 2 prerequisites:
- The first factor is to display sensitive information in the apps. If no sensitive data displayed, no headache :)
- The second is what you have written below. So I would suggest structuring something like:
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| ## Modes of Introduction | |
| ## Modes of Introduction | |
| - Display sensitive data on UI | |
| plus one of the following: | |
| - What you have below mode 1 | |
| - Mode 2 | |
| - ... |
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| ## Modes of Introduction | ||
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| - **Third-party apps with a permission to recording record the screen**: Third-party apps may record the screen while sensitive content is displayed. |
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Suggested change
| - **Third-party apps with a permission to recording record the screen**: Third-party apps may record the screen while sensitive content is displayed. | |
| - **Third-party apps with permission to capture or record the screen**: Third-party apps may record the screen while sensitive content is displayed. |
| ## Modes of Introduction | ||
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| - **Third-party apps with a permission to recording record the screen**: Third-party apps may record the screen while sensitive content is displayed. | ||
| - **Third-party apps with a permission to access the whole storage**: Third-party apps may access screenshots saved in storage after they are taken by the user or a tool. |
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Whole storage permission might not actually be required; partial access might be enough. So let's generalise the point to the minimum permission
Suggested change
| - **Third-party apps with a permission to access the whole storage**: Third-party apps may access screenshots saved in storage after they are taken by the user or a tool. | |
| - **Third-party apps with permission to access the screenshot and recording files**: Third-party apps may access screenshots or recordings saved in storage after they are taken by the user or a tool. |
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| - **Third-party apps with a permission to recording record the screen**: Third-party apps may record the screen while sensitive content is displayed. | ||
| - **Third-party apps with a permission to access the whole storage**: Third-party apps may access screenshots saved in storage after they are taken by the user or a tool. | ||
| - **External tools may record the screen**: Tools such as [scrcpy](https://github.com/Genymobile/scrcpy) and [QuickTime](https://support.apple.com/guide/quicktime-player/welcome/mac) can record the device's screen via a USB connection. |
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We might prefer to avoid naming tools in WEs to make them "even more agnostic" and future-proof (tools come and go, weaknesses would remain longer).
At a minimum, we should use markdown links @MASTG-TOOL-0024
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| - **Prevent screenshots using the `FLAG_SECURE` API**: On Android, use [`FLAG_SECURE`](https://developer.android.com/security/fraud-prevention/activities#flag_secure) to block screenshots and screen recordings of your app's content | ||
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| - **Detect taking a screenshot with `DETECT_SCREEN_CAPTURE` or `sceneCaptureState` API**: Use [`DETECT_SCREEN_CAPTURE`](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission#DETECT_SCREEN_CAPTURE) on Android or [`sceneCaptureState`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit/uitraitcollection/scenecapturestate) on iOS to detect when a screenshot is taken, depending on the platform |
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To append on @cpholguera 's suggestions, one way to mitigate the issue is to not display sensitive data on screen at all (e.g. redact)
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This PR closes OWASP/mastg#2695
There is another MASTG PR that adds TESTs for this weakness.