More testing.

Author: sunfishcode

tests/fs_additional.rs

@@ -1058,11 +1058,29 @@ fn dotdot_in_middle_of_symlink() {
     assert_eq!(data, foo);
 }
 
+/// Like `dotdot_in_middle_of_symlink` but with a `/.` at the end.
+#[test]
+fn dotdot_slashdot_in_middle_of_symlink() {
+    let tmpdir = tmpdir();
+
+    let foo = b"foo";
+    check!(tmpdir.write("target", foo));
+    check!(tmpdir.create_dir("b"));
+    let b = check!(tmpdir.open_dir("b"));
+    check!(symlink_dir("../.", &b, "up"));
+
+    let path = "b/up/target";
+    let mut file = check!(tmpdir.open(path));
+    let mut data = Vec::new();
+    check!(file.read_to_end(&mut data));
+    assert_eq!(data, foo);
+}
+
 /// Same as `dotdot_in_middle_of_symlink`, but use two levels of `..`.
 ///
 /// This fails on Windows for unknown reasons. Patches welcome.
 #[test]
-#[cfg(not(windows))]
+//#[cfg(not(windows))]
 fn dotdot_more_in_middle_of_symlink() {
     let tmpdir = tmpdir();
 
@@ -1079,12 +1097,31 @@ fn dotdot_more_in_middle_of_symlink() {
     assert_eq!(data, foo);
 }
 
+/// Like `dotdot_more_in_middle_of_symlink`, but with a `/.` at the end.
+#[test]
+//#[cfg(not(windows))]
+fn dotdot_slashdot_more_in_middle_of_symlink() {
+    let tmpdir = tmpdir();
+
+    let foo = b"foo";
+    check!(tmpdir.write("target", foo));
+    check!(tmpdir.create_dir_all("b/c"));
+    let b = check!(tmpdir.open_dir("b"));
+    check!(symlink_dir("c/../../.", &b, "up"));
+
+    let path = "b/up/target";
+    let mut file = check!(tmpdir.open(path));
+    let mut data = Vec::new();
+    check!(file.read_to_end(&mut data));
+    assert_eq!(data, foo);
+}
+
 /// Same as `dotdot_more_in_middle_of_symlink`, but the symlink doesn't
 /// include `c`.
 ///
 /// This fails on Windows for unknown reasons. Patches welcome.
 #[test]
-#[cfg(not(windows))]
+//#[cfg(not(windows))]
 fn dotdot_other_in_middle_of_symlink() {
     let tmpdir = tmpdir();
 
@@ -1101,6 +1138,25 @@ fn dotdot_other_in_middle_of_symlink() {
     assert_eq!(data, foo);
 }
 
+/// Like `dotdot_other_in_middle_of_symlink`, but with `/.` at the end.
+#[test]
+//#[cfg(not(windows))]
+fn dotdot_slashdot_other_in_middle_of_symlink() {
+    let tmpdir = tmpdir();
+
+    let foo = b"foo";
+    check!(tmpdir.write("target", foo));
+    check!(tmpdir.create_dir_all("b/c"));
+    let c = check!(tmpdir.open_dir("b/c"));
+    check!(symlink_dir("../../.", &c, "up"));
+
+    let path = "b/c/up/target";
+    let mut file = check!(tmpdir.open(path));
+    let mut data = Vec::new();
+    check!(file.read_to_end(&mut data));
+    assert_eq!(data, foo);
+}
+
 /// Same as `dotdot_more_in_middle_of_symlink`, but use a symlink that
 /// doesn't end with `..`.
 #[test]
@@ -1120,6 +1176,24 @@ fn dotdot_even_more_in_middle_of_symlink() {
     assert_eq!(data, foo);
 }
 
+/// Like `dotdot_even_more_in_middle_of_symlink`, but with a `/.` at the end.
+#[test]
+fn dotdot_slashdot_even_more_in_middle_of_symlink() {
+    let tmpdir = tmpdir();
+
+    let foo = b"foo";
+    check!(tmpdir.create_dir_all("b/c"));
+    check!(tmpdir.write("b/target", foo));
+    let b = check!(tmpdir.open_dir("b"));
+    check!(symlink_dir("c/../../b/.", &b, "up"));
+
+    let path = "b/up/target";
+    let mut file = check!(tmpdir.open(path));
+    let mut data = Vec::new();
+    check!(file.read_to_end(&mut data));
+    assert_eq!(data, foo);
+}
+
 /// Same as `dotdot_even_more_in_middle_of_symlink`, but the symlink doesn't
 /// include `c`.
 #[test]
@@ -1139,6 +1213,24 @@ fn dotdot_even_other_in_middle_of_symlink() {
     assert_eq!(data, foo);
 }
 
+/// Like `dotdot_even_other_in_middle_of_symlink`, but with a `/.` at the end.
+#[test]
+fn dotdot_slashdot_even_other_in_middle_of_symlink() {
+    let tmpdir = tmpdir();
+
+    let foo = b"foo";
+    check!(tmpdir.create_dir_all("b/c"));
+    check!(tmpdir.write("b/target", foo));
+    let c = check!(tmpdir.open_dir("b/c"));
+    check!(symlink_dir("../../b/.", &c, "up"));
+
+    let path = "b/c/up/target";
+    let mut file = check!(tmpdir.open(path));
+    let mut data = Vec::new();
+    check!(file.read_to_end(&mut data));
+    assert_eq!(data, foo);
+}
+
 /// Similar to `dotdot_in_middle_of_symlink`, but this time the symlink to
 /// `..` does happen to be the end of the path, so we need to make sure
 /// the implementation doesn't just do a stack pop when it sees the `..`
@@ -1167,6 +1259,31 @@ fn dotdot_at_end_of_symlink() {
     }
 }
 
+/// Like `dotdot_at_end_of_symlink`, but with a `/.` at the end.
+#[test]
+fn dotdot_slashdot_at_end_of_symlink() {
+    let tmpdir = tmpdir();
+
+    let foo = b"foo";
+    check!(tmpdir.write("target", foo));
+    check!(tmpdir.create_dir("b"));
+    let b = check!(tmpdir.open_dir("b"));
+    check!(symlink_dir("../.", &b, "up"));
+
+    // Do some things with `path` that might break with an `O_PATH` fd.
+    // On Linux, the `permissions` part doesn't because cap-std uses
+    // /proc/self/fd. But the `read_dir` part does.
+    let path = "b/up";
+
+    let perms = check!(tmpdir.metadata(path)).permissions();
+    check!(tmpdir.set_permissions(path, perms));
+
+    let contents = check!(tmpdir.read_dir(path));
+    for entry in contents {
+        let _entry = check!(entry);
+    }
+}
+
 /// Like `dotdot_at_end_of_symlink`, but do everything inside a new directory,
 /// so that `MaybeOwnedFile` doesn't reopen `.` which would artificially give
 /// us a non-`O_PATH` fd.
@@ -1194,3 +1311,29 @@ fn dotdot_at_end_of_symlink_all_inside_dir() {
         let _entry = check!(entry);
     }
 }
+
+/// `dotdot_at_end_of_symlink_all_inside_dir`, but with a `/.` at the end.
+#[test]
+fn dotdot_slashdot_at_end_of_symlink_all_inside_dir() {
+    let tmpdir = tmpdir();
+
+    let foo = b"foo";
+    check!(tmpdir.create_dir("dir"));
+    check!(tmpdir.write("dir/target", foo));
+    check!(tmpdir.create_dir("dir/b"));
+    let b = check!(tmpdir.open_dir("dir/b"));
+    check!(symlink_dir("../.", &b, "up"));
+
+    // Do some things with `path` that might break with an `O_PATH` fd.
+    // On Linux, the `permissions` part doesn't because cap-std uses
+    // /proc/self/fd. But the `read_dir` part does.
+    let path = "dir/b/up";
+
+    let perms = check!(tmpdir.metadata(path)).permissions();
+    check!(tmpdir.set_permissions(path, perms));
+
+    let contents = check!(tmpdir.read_dir(path));
+    for entry in contents {
+        let _entry = check!(entry);
+    }
+}