Skip to content

Fix 2-way auth max msg size, + some neats #3338

New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

Sign up for GitHub

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Merged
merged 1 commit into from
Nov 18, 2025
+20 −18
Merged

Fix 2-way auth max msg size, + some neats #3338

Show file tree
Hide file tree
Changes from all commits
Commits
Show all changes
1 commit
Select commit
File filter

Filter by extension

Filter by extension
Conversations
Failed to load comments.
Loading
Jump to
Jump to file
Failed to load files.
Loading
Diff view
Diff view
19 changes: 10 additions & 9 deletions mongoose.c
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -12097,6 +12097,11 @@ static bool mg_tls_encrypt(struct mg_connection *c, const uint8_t *msg,
uint8_t *iv =
c->is_client ? tls->enc.client_write_iv : tls->enc.server_write_iv;

if (msgsz > 16384) {
MG_ERROR(("msg longer than recordsz"));
return false;
}

#if MG_ENABLE_CHACHA20
#else
mg_gcm_initialize();
Expand All @@ -12118,9 +12123,8 @@ static bool mg_tls_encrypt(struct mg_connection *c, const uint8_t *msg,
#if MG_ENABLE_CHACHA20
(void) tag; // tag is only used in aes gcm
{
size_t maxlen = MG_IO_SIZE > 16384 ? 16384 : MG_IO_SIZE;
size_t n;
uint8_t *enc = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, maxlen + 256 + 1);
uint8_t *enc = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, msgsz + 256 + 1);
if (enc == NULL) return false;
n = mg_chacha20_poly1305_encrypt(enc, key, nonce, associated_data,
sizeof(associated_data), outmsg,
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -12379,9 +12383,7 @@ static const uint8_t secp256r1_sig_algs[12] = {

static bool mg_tls_server_send_cert_request(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
uint8_t *req = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
bool res;
if (req == NULL) return false;
uint8_t req[13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)];
req[0] = MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; // handshake header
MG_STORE_BE24(req + 1, 9 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
req[4] = 0; // context length
Expand All @@ -12392,10 +12394,8 @@ static bool mg_tls_server_send_cert_request(struct mg_connection *c) {
req + 11,
sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // signature hash algorithms length
memcpy(req + 13, (uint8_t *) secp256r1_sig_algs, sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, req, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
res = mg_tls_encrypt(c, req, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs), MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE);
mg_free(req);
return res;
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, req, sizeof(req));
return mg_tls_encrypt(c, req, sizeof(req), MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE);
}

static bool mg_tls_send_cert(struct mg_connection *c, bool is_client) {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -13312,6 +13312,7 @@ void mg_tls_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
long n;
bool res;
if (c->is_closing) return; // we don't clear rx buf, so ignore what's left
if (c->is_client) {
// will clear is_hs when sending last chunk
res = mg_tls_client_handshake(c);
Expand Down
19 changes: 10 additions & 9 deletions src/tls_builtin.c
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -419,6 +419,11 @@ static bool mg_tls_encrypt(struct mg_connection *c, const uint8_t *msg,
uint8_t *iv =
c->is_client ? tls->enc.client_write_iv : tls->enc.server_write_iv;

if (msgsz > 16384) {
MG_ERROR(("msg longer than recordsz"));
return false;
}

#if MG_ENABLE_CHACHA20
#else
mg_gcm_initialize();
Expand All @@ -440,9 +445,8 @@ static bool mg_tls_encrypt(struct mg_connection *c, const uint8_t *msg,
#if MG_ENABLE_CHACHA20
(void) tag; // tag is only used in aes gcm
{
size_t maxlen = MG_IO_SIZE > 16384 ? 16384 : MG_IO_SIZE;
size_t n;
uint8_t *enc = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, maxlen + 256 + 1);
uint8_t *enc = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, msgsz + 256 + 1);
if (enc == NULL) return false;
n = mg_chacha20_poly1305_encrypt(enc, key, nonce, associated_data,
sizeof(associated_data), outmsg,
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -701,9 +705,7 @@ static const uint8_t secp256r1_sig_algs[12] = {

static bool mg_tls_server_send_cert_request(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
uint8_t *req = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
bool res;
if (req == NULL) return false;
uint8_t req[13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)];
req[0] = MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; // handshake header
MG_STORE_BE24(req + 1, 9 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
req[4] = 0; // context length
Expand All @@ -714,10 +716,8 @@ static bool mg_tls_server_send_cert_request(struct mg_connection *c) {
req + 11,
sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // signature hash algorithms length
memcpy(req + 13, (uint8_t *) secp256r1_sig_algs, sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, req, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
res = mg_tls_encrypt(c, req, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs), MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE);
mg_free(req);
return res;
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, req, sizeof(req));
return mg_tls_encrypt(c, req, sizeof(req), MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE);
}

static bool mg_tls_send_cert(struct mg_connection *c, bool is_client) {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1634,6 +1634,7 @@ void mg_tls_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
long n;
bool res;
if (c->is_closing) return; // we don't clear rx buf, so ignore what's left
if (c->is_client) {
// will clear is_hs when sending last chunk
res = mg_tls_client_handshake(c);
Expand Down