chore(deps): update module github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 to v4.5.2 [security]

[renovate-sh-app]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4	v4.5.0 -> v4.5.2

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2024-51744

Summary

Unclear documentation of the error behavior in ParseWithClaims can lead to situation where users are potentially not checking errors in the way they should be. Especially, if a token is both expired and invalid, the errors returned by ParseWithClaims return both error codes. If users only check for the jwt.ErrTokenExpired using error.Is, they will ignore the embedded jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid and thus potentially accept invalid tokens.

Fix

We have back-ported the error handling logic from the v5 branch to the v4 branch. In this logic, the ParseWithClaims function will immediately return in "dangerous" situations (e.g., an invalid signature), limiting the combined errors only to situations where the signature is valid, but further validation failed (e.g., if the signature is valid, but is expired AND has the wrong audience). This fix is part of the 4.5.1 release.

Workaround

We are aware that this changes the behaviour of an established function and is not 100 % backwards compatible, so updating to 4.5.1 might break your code. In case you cannot update to 4.5.0, please make sure that you are properly checking for all errors ("dangerous" ones first), so that you are not running in the case detailed above.

token, err := /* jwt.Parse or similar */
if token.Valid {
	fmt.Println("You look nice today")
} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenMalformed) {
	fmt.Println("That's not even a token")
} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenUnverifiable) {
	fmt.Println("We could not verify this token")
} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid) {
	fmt.Println("This token has an invalid signature")
} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenExpired) || errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenNotValidYet) {
	// Token is either expired or not active yet
	fmt.Println("Timing is everything")
} else {
	fmt.Println("Couldn't handle this token:", err)
}

CVE-2025-30204

Summary

Function parse.ParseUnverified currently splits (via a call to strings.Split) its argument (which is untrusted data) on periods.

As a result, in the face of a malicious request whose Authorization header consists of Bearer followed by many period characters, a call to that function incurs allocations to the tune of O(n) bytes (where n stands for the length of the function's argument), with a constant factor of about 16. Relevant weakness: CWE-405: Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification)

Details

See parse.ParseUnverified

Impact

Excessive memory allocation

---

Improper error handling in ParseWithClaims and bad documentation may cause dangerous situations in github.com/golang-jwt/jwt

CVE-2024-51744 / GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r / GO-2024-3250

More information

Details

Improper error handling in ParseWithClaims and bad documentation may cause dangerous situations in github.com/golang-jwt/jwt

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r
• https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/commit/7b1c1c00a171c6c79bbdb40e4ce7d197060c1c2c

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Bad documentation of error handling in ParseWithClaims can lead to potentially dangerous situations

CVE-2024-51744 / GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r / GO-2024-3250

More information

Details

Summary

Unclear documentation of the error behavior in ParseWithClaims can lead to situation where users are potentially not checking errors in the way they should be. Especially, if a token is both expired and invalid, the errors returned by ParseWithClaims return both error codes. If users only check for the jwt.ErrTokenExpired using error.Is, they will ignore the embedded jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid and thus potentially accept invalid tokens.

Fix

We have back-ported the error handling logic from the v5 branch to the v4 branch. In this logic, the ParseWithClaims function will immediately return in "dangerous" situations (e.g., an invalid signature), limiting the combined errors only to situations where the signature is valid, but further validation failed (e.g., if the signature is valid, but is expired AND has the wrong audience). This fix is part of the 4.5.1 release.

Workaround

We are aware that this changes the behaviour of an established function and is not 100 % backwards compatible, so updating to 4.5.1 might break your code. In case you cannot update to 4.5.0, please make sure that you are properly checking for all errors ("dangerous" ones first), so that you are not running in the case detailed above.

token, err := /* jwt.Parse or similar */
if token.Valid {
	fmt.Println("You look nice today")
} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenMalformed) {
	fmt.Println("That's not even a token")
} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenUnverifiable) {
	fmt.Println("We could not verify this token")
} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid) {
	fmt.Println("This token has an invalid signature")
} else if errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenExpired) || errors.Is(err, jwt.ErrTokenNotValidYet) {
	// Token is either expired or not active yet
	fmt.Println("Timing is everything")
} else {
	fmt.Println("Couldn't handle this token:", err)
}

Severity

• CVSS Score: 2.3 / 10 (Low)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51744
• https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/commit/7b1c1c00a171c6c79bbdb40e4ce7d197060c1c2c
• https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

jwt-go allows excessive memory allocation during header parsing

CVE-2025-30204 / GHSA-mh63-6h87-95cp / GO-2025-3553

More information

Details

Summary

Function parse.ParseUnverified currently splits (via a call to strings.Split) its argument (which is untrusted data) on periods.

As a result, in the face of a malicious request whose Authorization header consists of Bearer followed by many period characters, a call to that function incurs allocations to the tune of O(n) bytes (where n stands for the length of the function's argument), with a constant factor of about 16. Relevant weakness: CWE-405: Asymmetric Resource Consumption (Amplification)

Details

See parse.ParseUnverified

Impact

Excessive memory allocation

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-mh63-6h87-95cp
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30204
• https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/commit/0951d184286dece21f73c85673fd308786ffe9c3
• https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/commit/bf316c48137a1212f8d0af9288cc9ce8e59f1afb
• https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt
• https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250404-0002

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Excessive memory allocation during header parsing in github.com/golang-jwt/jwt

CVE-2025-30204 / GHSA-mh63-6h87-95cp / GO-2025-3553

More information

Details

Excessive memory allocation during header parsing in github.com/golang-jwt/jwt

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-mh63-6h87-95cp
• https://github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/commit/0951d184286dece21f73c85673fd308786ffe9c3

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

golang-jwt/jwt (github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4)

v4.5.2

Compare Source

See GHSA-mh63-6h87-95cp

Full Changelog: golang-jwt/jwt@v4.5.1...v4.5.2

v4.5.1

Compare Source

Security

Unclear documentation of the error behavior in ParseWithClaims in <= 4.5.0 could lead to situation where users are potentially not checking errors in the way they should be. Especially, if a token is both expired and invalid, the errors returned by ParseWithClaims return both error codes. If users only check for the jwt.ErrTokenExpired using error.Is, they will ignore the embedded jwt.ErrTokenSignatureInvalid and thus potentially accept invalid tokens.

This issue was documented in GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r and fixed in this release.

Note: v5 was not affected by this issue. So upgrading to this release version is also recommended.

What's Changed

• Back-ported error-handling logic in ParseWithClaims from v5 branch. This fixes GHSA-29wx-vh33-7x7r.

Full Changelog: golang-jwt/jwt@v4.5.0...v4.5.1

---

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