[comp] Production Deploy

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Project	Deployment	Preview	Comments	Updated (UTC)
app (staging)	Ready	Preview	Comment	Oct 23, 2025 1:47pm
portal (staging)	Ready	Preview	Comment	Oct 23, 2025 1:47pm

[comp-ai-code-review]

🔒 Comp AI - Security Review

🔴 Risk Level: HIGH

OSV/npm scan reported no known package CVEs in this diff.

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📦 Dependency Vulnerabilities

✅ No known vulnerabilities detected in dependencies.

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🛡️ Code Security Analysis

View 14 file(s) with issues

🟡 apps/api/src/attachments/upload-attachment.dto.ts (MEDIUM Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	No max size for base64 fileData (memory/DoS risk)	MEDIUM
2	fileData base64 not validated against actual MIME (spoofing)	MEDIUM
3	No antivirus or content scan for uploaded files	MEDIUM
4	fileName not sanitized (path traversal/overwrite risk)	MEDIUM
5	No validation of file extension vs fileType (mismatch attack)	MEDIUM

Recommendations:

1. Enforce a server-side maximum decoded file size and/or maximum base64 string length. Prefer streaming uploads and reject files whose decoded byte-size exceeds a configured limit (e.g., 5–50 MB depending on app).
2. Validate file bytes (magic numbers) against the declared MIME type using a reliable library (e.g., file-type, libmagic). Reject mismatches between declared fileType and actual content.
3. Perform antivirus/malware scanning on uploaded files (e.g., ClamAV, commercial scanners, or cloud provider scanning) prior to making them available or storing permanently.
4. Sanitize and normalize fileName before use: strip path separators, use path.basename, remove/control special characters, enforce a safe whitelist of characters or generate a server-side unique filename and store original name only as metadata.
5. Enforce mapping between file extension and MIME type; reject or re-map mismatches. Prefer storing files with server-generated safe extensions/names and keep original extension only after validation.
6. Store uploads outside the webroot, use non-guessable names/paths, apply least-privilege ACLs, and serve files through an authenticated proxy or signed URLs rather than direct filesystem paths.
7. Limit allowed types to the minimum required by the application and consider additional checks for image content (e.g., resize/validate dimensions), and reject archive files or scan their contents recursively.
8. Add rate limiting, per-user quotas and logging/alerts for upload endpoints to mitigate abuse/DoS attempts.

🔴 apps/api/src/tasks/dto/upload-attachment.dto.ts (HIGH Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	No server-side file size limit for fileData (DoS risk)	HIGH
2	IsBase64 validates format only, not decoded size or payload	HIGH
3	Client-supplied fileType is trusted and can be spoofed	HIGH
4	No verification that decoded content matches declared MIME	HIGH
5	No malware/macro scanning for uploaded documents	HIGH
6	fileName not sanitized; path traversal or overwrite risk	HIGH

Recommendations:

1. Enforce a decoded-file-size limit on the server: decode (or stream-decode) the base64 and reject files larger than a configured limit (e.g., 5–50 MB depending on app). Implement streaming decoding to avoid loading large files fully into memory.
2. Add server-side checks that validate decoded payload size (not just base64 length). Use class-validator/custom validator to check decoded byte-length or perform this check in the upload handler before persisting.
3. Ignore the client-sent MIME type for security decisions. Detect MIME/content type server-side via content-sniffing (e.g., file-type library or libmagic) and validate against allowed formats.
4. Verify decoded content matches expected file signature (magic bytes) for declared/allowed types before processing or storing.
5. Integrate malware scanning (antivirus and macro scanning) for uploaded documents and block or quarantine suspicious files. Apply file-type specific scanning for office docs (macros).
6. Sanitize fileName: strip path separators and control chars, restrict to a safe whitelist of characters and length, or replace client filename with a generated unique ID while storing the original name separately (metadata). Prevent direct filesystem writes using client-provided names.
7. Apply per-user and global quotas, rate-limiting and other anti-DoS protections on uploads.

🟡 apps/app/src/app/(app)/[orgId]/cloud-tests/actions/connect-cloud.ts (MEDIUM Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	Unvalidated header used in revalidatePath allowing attacker-controlled path	MEDIUM
2	Plaintext credentials passed to integration handler during validation	MEDIUM
3	Error messages and console.error may leak sensitive details or creds	MEDIUM
4	No rate-limiting or auth checks around runTests and revalidation enabling DoS	MEDIUM

Recommendations:

1. Validate and restrict revalidatePath input: derive revalidation paths from server-side known routes or a whitelist, require the path to start with '/', normalize and resolve (reject '..'), restrict allowed characters (e.g. ^/[A-Za-z0-9/_-]+$), and verify the path belongs to the active organization or expected namespace before calling revalidatePath.
2. Do not accept raw arbitrary headers for paths. Prefer sending a server-known route identifier (e.g., a route key) from the client and map it to a concrete safe path on the server.
3. Avoid passing raw plaintext credentials to external/integration handlers. Use a dedicated validation API on the integration handler that accepts only the minimal fields required for validation or exchange credentials for ephemeral validation tokens (e.g., STS for AWS). If plaintext must be used in-memory, ensure it is never logged, keep it in memory only, and ensure the handler explicitly documents/implements no-logging behavior for validation.
4. Harden credential input validation: use provider-specific zod schemas (e.g., require accessKeyId/secret for AWS, service account JSON shape for GCP) rather than a permissive z.record(z.string(), z.string()).
5. Sanitize and redact errors returned to clients. Return generic messages like 'Failed to validate credentials' and log detailed errors only to secure logs with secrets redaction. Do not console.error the full error object or stack in production; use structured logging with PII/secret scrubbing.
6. Add authorization checks for triggering heavy operations: ensure the calling user has appropriate org-level permissions/role to create/update integrations and to trigger runTests.
7. Introduce rate-limiting, debouncing, or a job-queue for runTests and the revalidation flow. Use background workers with concurrency controls, and require privileged roles for immediate scan triggers to prevent abuse/DoS via repeated calls.
8. When persisting credentials, ensure encryption keys are stored and rotated securely; consider encrypting only after validation and before any other processing to minimize exposure window.
9. If using third-party/in-house integration handlers, audit them for logging of credentials and enforce a validation interface contract that forbids persisting or logging raw credentials during validation.

🟡 apps/app/src/app/(app)/[orgId]/cloud-tests/actions/disconnect-cloud.ts (MEDIUM Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	Unvalidated header-derived path used in revalidatePath	MEDIUM
2	Potential cache invalidation DoS via attacker-controlled header	MEDIUM
3	Internal error messages returned to client	MEDIUM
4	Authorization only checks existence of activeOrganizationId	MEDIUM

Recommendations:

1. Validate and normalize the path before calling revalidatePath: ensure it starts with '/' and only contains allowed characters. Reject or canonicalize URLs (e.g., strip protocol/host) so external URLs cannot be passed through.
2. Restrict revalidation to a whitelist of known internal routes (e.g., compare against a set of allowed paths) instead of using arbitrary header-derived values.
3. Avoid using attacker-controllable headers as the source of the revalidation path. Prefer server-side construction of the path from known context (e.g., route params / orgId) or use an explicit input validated by zod.
4. Do not return raw error.message to the client. Return a generic error string (e.g., 'Failed to disconnect cloud provider') and log full details on the server for diagnostics.
5. Enforce explicit authorization checks beyond presence of session.activeOrganizationId: verify the authenticated user has permission/role to delete integrations for that organization (e.g., owner/admin or scoped permission).
6. Add rate limiting and/or action throttling for destructive actions (deletes) to mitigate abuse or accidental mass invalidation.
7. Sanitize header inputs (referer, x-pathname) and/or ignore untrusted headers from external clients; treat headers as tainted input.
8. Consider instrumenting revalidation calls with limits and monitoring (e.g., per-org or per-user revalidation quotas) to detect and block DoS patterns.

🟡 apps/app/src/app/(app)/[orgId]/cloud-tests/actions/run-tests.ts (MEDIUM Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	revalidatePath uses unvalidated Referer/x-pathname header	MEDIUM
2	Returns handle.publicAccessToken to caller (possible token leakage)	MEDIUM
3	No explicit org membership or role permission check before triggering	MEDIUM
4	Raw error.message returned to client may leak internals	MEDIUM

Recommendations:

1. Validate and whitelist header-derived paths before calling revalidatePath. Parse the header with URL and ensure origin matches your app, ensure the pathname begins with a safe prefix (e.g., '/app' or other allowed routes), strip any query/fragment, and reject or default to a safe path if validation fails.
2. Do not return tokens (publicAccessToken) directly in the API response. Either omit the token, return only a non-sensitive identifier, or require a separate authenticated, audited flow to retrieve the token. If the token must be exposed, scope and expiry should be tightly limited and logged.
3. Enforce explicit org membership and role/permission checks before triggering tasks. Verify the session user is a member of orgId and has an allowed role (e.g., 'admin' or 'integration:run') — do not rely solely on the presence of activeOrganizationId.
4. Avoid returning raw error.message to clients. Return a generic error (e.g., 'Failed to trigger integration tests') and log the detailed error and stack trace server-side for debugging/monitoring.
5. Normalize and sanitize the path used with revalidatePath (prevent path traversal or injection) and consider maintaining a server-side mapping of allowed paths to revalidate rather than accepting header-derived values.
6. Add rate-limiting and CSRF protections for this server action to reduce abuse (especially if it triggers expensive background work).
7. Instrument auditing/logging around task triggers and token issuance so actions can be traced to authenticated users and sessions.

🟡 apps/app/src/app/(app)/[orgId]/cloud-tests/actions/update-cloud-credentials.ts (MEDIUM Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	RevalidatePath uses untrusted header (referer/x-pathname) — attacker-controlled path	MEDIUM
2	No role/permission check before updating org cloud credentials	MEDIUM
3	No whitelist of allowed credential keys per provider	MEDIUM
4	userSettings replaced entirely allowing overwrite or deletion of other data	MEDIUM
5	Errors logged directly may expose sensitive data in logs	MEDIUM
6	Falsy credential values skipped during encryption causing inconsistent state	MEDIUM

Recommendations:

1. Validate and canonicalize the revalidation path against a strict allowlist of allowed routes (or derive the path server-side). Do not use raw Referer or custom headers to drive revalidation. Reject or normalize unexpected values.
2. Enforce role-based authorization / permission checks before updating integration data (e.g., verify session user has admin or integration-management role scoped to session.activeOrganizationId).
3. Implement a per-provider whitelist of allowed credential keys and their expected formats. Reject unexpected keys instead of accepting arbitrary record keys.
4. Merge new/updated credential keys into the existing userSettings JSON instead of overwriting it wholesale. Read the current userSettings and perform a controlled merge, or update only the explicit fields supported by the whitelist.
5. Avoid logging full error objects that may contain sensitive data. Log minimal, non-sensitive information (e.g., error codes), and redact or sanitize any sensitive fields before writing to logs. Use structured logging with redaction rules.
6. Handle falsy values explicitly. Decide whether empty strings should be stored (and encrypted) or treated as deletions; do not silently skip keys for falsy values. Validate credential values according to provider requirements and store explicit nulls/deletions when intended.

🔴 apps/app/src/app/(app)/[orgId]/cloud-tests/actions/validate-aws-credentials.ts (HIGH Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	Sensitive AWS credentials may be exposed in server logs (console.error)	HIGH
2	Detailed error.message returned to caller can leak AWS internals or secrets	HIGH
3	No validation of AWS key format (only non-empty strings)	HIGH
4	No rate-limiting/brute-force protection on credential validation endpoint	HIGH

Recommendations:

1. Stop logging raw error objects. Remove console.error(...) or sanitize/redact before logging (do not log AWS keys or full error objects). Use structured logging that omits sensitive fields.
2. Do not return raw error.message to callers. Return a generic error like 'Failed to validate AWS credentials' and log detailed diagnostics internally with access controls.
3. Tighten input validation: enforce AWS key ID/secret format (length and allowed characters) in the zod schema (e.g., regex for AKIA... pattern and secret length) and reject obviously malformed values before calling AWS.
4. Add rate limiting and brute-force protections on this action (per-IP, per-account throttles), and implement exponential backoff and request throttling to avoid abuse and AWS API misuse.
5. Never persist credentials. If you must handle credentials transiently, keep them only in memory, avoid writing to logs, and ensure they are cleared from memory as soon as possible.
6. Consider safer UX patterns: encourage use of temporary credentials (STS assume-role) or OAuth-style flows instead of direct long-lived key entry; restrict minimal permissions for validation operations.
7. Instrument monitoring/alerts for repeated failures and unusual usage patterns to detect credential-guessing attempts.

🔴 apps/app/src/app/(app)/[orgId]/cloud-tests/components/CloudConnectionCard.tsx (HIGH Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	Missing input validation: only checks non-empty values	HIGH
2	Sensitive fields default to text; secrets not masked	HIGH
3	Credentials stored in client state as plaintext	HIGH
4	Console.error may log sensitive data	HIGH
5	External logoUrl/img can leak client IP to third parties	HIGH
6	guideUrl/logoUrl used directly without sanitization	HIGH

Recommendations:

1. Enforce server-side validation of all credential fields (format, length, allowed chars). Do not rely on client-side checks alone.
2. On the client, validate common formats (ARNs, JSON keys, emails, UUIDs) where appropriate to provide better UX and prevent malformed data from being submitted.
3. Treat secret fields as secrets by default: render them as (or textarea with masking) and set autocomplete="new-password" or appropriate autocomplete attributes. Consider making field.type mandatory for secret fields or infer from field.id (e.g., contains "secret", "key", "token").
4. Avoid keeping credentials in long-lived or easily inspectable client state. Minimize time stored in memory, clear credentials immediately after use (both on success and failure), and clear on component unmount (use an effect cleanup).
5. Transmit credentials only over TLS and to a backend endpoint that performs the actual connection; do not perform sensitive operations purely on the client. The backend should handle secrets securely (e.g., in memory with limited lifetime, not logged).
6. Remove or redact sensitive values from logs. Replace console.error(error) with redacted logging (e.g., console.error('Connection error:', sanitizeError(error))) and ensure server logs do not contain full credential values.
7. For external assets (logoUrl) and links (guideUrl): validate/sanitize URLs before rendering. Restrict allowed schemes (https: and maybe data: only if necessary) and optionally maintain an allowlist of hostnames or proxy external assets through your server to avoid direct client requests to third parties.
8. Add Content Security Policy (CSP) and Referrer-Policy headers to reduce information leakage and control which external resources can be loaded.
9. Ensure anchors cannot be used for script execution: validate that guideUrl does not start with javascript: or other dangerous schemes. Keep rel="noopener noreferrer" for _blank links (already present).
10. Consider UX improvements for errors: do not surface raw server error objects to the UI or logs; present generic error messages to users and log details only in secure server logs.

🔴 apps/app/src/app/(app)/[orgId]/cloud-tests/components/CloudSettingsModal.tsx (HIGH Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	Credentials stored in client React state (exposes secrets in browser)	HIGH
2	No client-side validation before sending credentials to server actions	HIGH
3	Potential leakage of secrets via console.error or toast messages	HIGH
4	No CSRF protection visible when invoking server actions	HIGH
5	Untrusted input may reach server enabling injection if not sanitized	HIGH

Recommendations:

1. Avoid keeping long-lived secrets in client JS state. Submit credentials directly to the server and clear any in-memory values immediately after use. Do not persist secrets to localStorage/sessionStorage or expose them to other browser contexts.
2. Enforce strict server-side validation and normalization of all credential fields (length, character set, expected format). Treat client-side checks as UX-only and never as the primary validation.
3. Never log raw error objects or secret material to the browser console. Sanitize or redact error content before showing toasts or logging. Replace console.error(error) with console.error({ message: 'Update failed' }) or send non-sensitive diagnostics to a secure server-side log.
4. Protect server endpoints/actions against CSRF. Use same-site, HTTP-only cookies with CSRF tokens, double-submit cookie pattern, or ensure server actions validate origin/Referer and authenticated session state.
5. Assume all client input is untrusted. Perform server-side sanitization/escaping before using values in commands, database queries, or shell calls. Use parameterized queries, avoid constructing commands with concatenation, and apply contextual escaping.
6. Use short-lived credentials and rotate keys after updates. Consider issuing temporary tokens via a backend that exchanges user input for ephemeral credentials (e.g., use AWS STS, GCP short-lived service account tokens).
7. Limit UI exposure: show only masked values, minimize retention windows (clear state and inputs on modal close), and restrict component-level error messages to non-sensitive content.
8. Audit the server implementations of updateCloudCredentialsAction and disconnectCloudAction to confirm they enforce authentication, authorization, input validation, CSRF protection, secure storage (encryption at rest), and proper logging practices.

🔴 apps/app/src/app/(app)/[orgId]/cloud-tests/components/EmptyState.tsx (HIGH Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	Hardcoded public tokens in logoUrl query strings	HIGH
2	Sensitive credentials stored in React state (plain text)	HIGH
3	Service account JSON not validated or parsed client-side	HIGH
4	Inputs only checked for presence; no format validation	HIGH
5	Secrets sent to actions without client-side encryption or protection	HIGH
6	Potential secret leakage via logs/toasts if server echoes credentials	HIGH
7	Actions invoked client-side without explicit auth/CSRF checks	HIGH

Recommendations:

1. Remove hardcoded tokens from client code. Move tokens/keys to server-side configuration or environment variables. If the image service requires a key, proxy image requests via a server endpoint so the token is not embedded in front-end bundle.
2. Avoid persisting secrets in React state for longer than necessary. Use refs or ephemeral variables, clear/zero memory as soon as the secret is sent, and avoid storing secrets in Redux/localStorage or anywhere persisted. Consider using input type='password' or masked UI for secrets and immediately clear the value after submission.
3. Validate the GCP service account JSON format client-side before sending (e.g., try JSON.parse and check expected fields) to catch obvious errors and prevent accidental leakage of malformed content. However, enforce full validation and authorization on the server.
4. Add stricter format validation for credential fields (e.g., regex for AWS Access Key ID, UUID format for Azure IDs) and provide clear client-side error messages. Still treat client-side validation as UX only — server must enforce strong validation.
5. Ensure all communications to validateAwsCredentialsAction and connectCloudAction occur over TLS and that the receiving endpoints perform strong server-side validation, authentication, authorization, and rate-limiting. Consider using short-lived credential exchange flows (e.g., browser -> server -> cloud provider) or encrypting payloads with a public key if extra protection is required.
6. Never log or display secrets in toasts, console logs, or error messages. Sanitize any server error returned to the client to avoid echoing secrets. Mask or redact any values that might contain secrets before rendering.
7. Implement server-side protections: require authenticated requests, validate CSRF tokens for state-changing actions invoked from the browser (or use same-site cookies + CSRF tokens), and enforce authorization checks on the server actions (validate that the user can connect the given cloud account).
8. On the server, store sensitive cloud credentials securely (use a secrets manager / encrypted at rest with KMS). If possible, prefer delegated OAuth or provider-specific token flows rather than storing long-lived secrets.
9. Add monitoring and alerting for suspicious attempts (failed validation attempts, repeated credential submissions), and rate-limit endpoints that accept credentials to reduce abuse and brute-force risk.

🔴 apps/app/src/app/(app)/[orgId]/cloud-tests/components/ResultsView.tsx (HIGH Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	scanAccessToken passed to client — potential secret leakage	HIGH
2	scanTaskId exposed in client — internal ID/info disclosure	HIGH
3	Client-side onRunScan can be triggered by any user action	HIGH
4	run.error.message rendered directly — may reveal internal details	HIGH
5	No server-side enforcement shown for scan triggers/filters	HIGH

Recommendations:

1. Do not send long-lived or privileged access tokens to the browser. Keep secrets server-side. If client needs to establish realtime connections, mint short-lived, least-privilege tokens on the server that are user-scoped and expire quickly.
2. Avoid exposing internal task IDs directly to the client. Use opaque public IDs or map internal IDs server-side before returning them to the client.
3. Proxy realtime connections through an authenticated server endpoint that validates the user and request context. The server should use the real access token and only relay necessary data to the client.
4. Require server-side authorization and rate-limiting for actions that trigger scans (onRunScan). Validate caller identity and enforce per-user or per-org quotas to prevent abuse/DoS.
5. Do not render raw internal error messages from backend/realtime services to end users. Show a generic error message and record detailed errors in server logs. If you must display some details, sanitize and redact sensitive info.
6. Add server-side checks for any filter or action that could affect resource usage or leak information. Never rely solely on client-side controls for enforcement.
7. Consider adding Content Security Policy (CSP), CSRF protections, and input validation on the server for any endpoints invoked by the client.

🟡 apps/app/src/app/(app)/[orgId]/cloud-tests/page.tsx (MEDIUM Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	Unsanitized orgId used directly in DB queries (SQL injection risk)	MEDIUM
2	Route param orgId lacks validation or type checking	MEDIUM
3	Potential excessive data exposure from unfiltered findings/providers	MEDIUM

Recommendations:

1. Validate and sanitize orgId before use (e.g. enforce UUID pattern or runtime schema with zod/io-ts) to ensure format and prevent unexpected input.
2. Scope DB queries to the session's organization id (session.session.activeOrganizationId) rather than trusting the route param. For example, derive organizationId for DB queries from the authenticated session and treat params only as UI-level values.
3. Keep authorization checks early and explicit. After obtaining session, assert session.session.activeOrganizationId exists and use it directly for queries; treat mismatches as an error/redirect (already present) but also avoid using the raw param in DB filters.
4. Rely on parameterized queries/ORM (Prisma does parameterize) but do not consider that a substitute for input validation and authorization scoping.
5. Restrict returned fields to only those needed by the client. Omit or redact sensitive fields (e.g., detailed remediation steps or other sensitive metadata) and consider pagination or rate limits for large result sets.
6. Add runtime parameter validation (zod/io-ts) for route params and log suspicious param tampering or repeated mismatches for monitoring/alerting.

🟡 apps/app/src/app/api/cloud-tests/findings/route.ts (MEDIUM Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	Authorization only checks orgId exists; no membership/role check	MEDIUM
2	No validation of session.activeOrganizationId before DB query	MEDIUM
3	Console.error logs raw errors and may leak sensitive info	MEDIUM

Recommendations:

1. Enforce authorization beyond presence of activeOrganizationId: verify that the authenticated user is a member of the organization and has the appropriate read permissions before returning findings.
2. Validate and type-check session.session.activeOrganizationId before using in DB queries (e.g., ensure it's the expected UUID/string/number format). Consider normalizing and rejecting unexpected types to avoid query errors or logic bypasses.
3. Avoid logging raw error objects to console in production. Use structured/sanitized logging and store full error details in a secure log store. Return minimal, generic error messages to clients (e.g., 'Failed to fetch findings').
4. Add server-side audits or additional checks (e.g., query the user->organization membership table or use the auth library's authorization APIs) to ensure orgId in session is legitimate for the current user.

🟡 apps/app/src/app/api/cloud-tests/providers/route.ts (MEDIUM Risk)

#	Issue	Risk Level
1	No verification that session.activeOrganizationId grants access	MEDIUM
2	orgId used in DB query without validation or type checks	MEDIUM
3	Possible IDOR if session orgId can be tampered or forged	MEDIUM
4	Detailed error logging via console.error may leak info	MEDIUM

Recommendations:

1. Validate orgId format and type before using it in queries (e.g., ensure it matches expected UUID pattern or numeric format).
2. Do not rely solely on session.activeOrganizationId: fetch the authenticated user's id from the session and verify server-side that the user is a member of the organization and has the required role/permissions before returning org data.
3. Re-authorize org access against the database (e.g., query OrganizationMemberships or UsersOrganizations table) rather than trusting session fields that could be forged or mis-set.
4. Avoid logging full error objects to console in production. Log only non-sensitive error identifiers/messages and store detailed traces in a secured log store with access controls. Redact or omit tokens, PII, and internal identifiers from logs.
5. Add rate limiting and enforce endpoint scopes/permissions so a compromised session cannot be used to enumerate data at scale.
6. Ensure your DB access library/ORM queries are parameterized (the shown code uses an ORM call which typically parameterizes inputs) and keep that pattern; still validate types to avoid logic-level bugs.

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💡 Recommendations

View 3 recommendation(s)

1. Search the changed files for hardcoded secrets/tokens (e.g., AKIA, BEGIN PRIVATE KEY, client_secret, tokens in query strings) and remove any literals from source; if found, remove from repo history and rotate the exposed secret.
2. Audit code paths that accept user input into backend operations: validate and canonicalize route params (e.g., orgId) before using them in DB queries or ORM filters; enforce type/format checks (UUID/regex or zod) and rely on parameterized ORM calls rather than string concatenation.
3. Inspect endpoints and handlers that build paths from headers or client input (e.g., revalidatePath, referer/x-pathname usage) and replace direct use of attacker-controlled values with server-derived or whitelist-mapped paths; avoid concatenating raw input into filesystem/DB/path calls.

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